Several papers find that when target CEOs get extra benefits during mergers, takeover premiums are lower. This is interpreted as a conflict of interest: target CEOs sacrifice premiums for personal gain, facilitating a wealth transfer from target to acquirer shareholders. We examine merger bonuses and find evidence inconsistent with wealth transfer. Results indicate that when target CEOs get bonuses, acquirers pay less but also get less in the form of low synergies. The evidence suggests that bonuses are used to revise compensation contracts when takeovers generate small synergy gains helping firms circumvent conflicts of interests between target CEOs and their shareholders.
Introduction
Acquisition premiums paid to target stockholders are lower when target CEOs receive a mix of special merger-related benefits (Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack, 2004) , when target CEOs are hired by the acquirer (Wulf, 2004) , or when they get unscheduled options during merger negotiations (Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011) . A common conclusion of this work is that extra benefits to target CEOs are explained by a rent-extraction agency problem, with target CEOs sacrificing merger premiums for personal gain. For example, in interpreting their results, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004, p. 59) argue, "… the financial cost to target shareholders of these arrangements would seem to exceed substantially the benefits received by their CEOs. This imbalance, arising from a conflict of interest between target CEOs and their shareholders, would seem to represent a wealth transfer from shareholders of the target to shareholders of the buyer." Following Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) , we call the common view expressed in the literature the wealth transfer hypothesis. This paper investigates merger bonuses, a particular acquisition-related payment frequently dispensed to target CEOs, and finds evidence in opposition to the wealth transfer hypothesis. Similar to the existing literature, we show that target premiums decrease when target CEOs get a bonus. But we go further to investigate the question implicit in the last statement of the above quote: whether merger bonuses transfer wealth to acquirer shareholders. We find that, on average, the acquirer shareholders earn lower returns when merger bonuses are given. Thus, while the simple wealth transfer story for bonuses is surely appealing and consistent with the documented evidence for other merger-related side-payments to target CEOs, our evidence suggests that instead merger bonuses are given when overall synergies from a merger are low. Furthermore, the entirety of our evidence, of which the acquirer return is only part, is indicative of an alternative overall view of the role of merger bonuses which we next explore.
In our alternative view, a merger bonus for the target CEO can arise as a revision to the CEO benefits package in target firms expected to generate inferior takeover gains. Under this contractual revision hypothesis, a side payment in case of a takeover bid adjusts the CEO's merger-related compensation in order to circumvent potential conflicts of interests. In this situation, an extra benefit provided during an acquisition attempt on the firm is a choice variable that maximizes the target firm's value given its operating and information environment as well as the reservation wage and future career opportunities of the target CEO.
Both of these hypotheses stem from the fact that managers start with very different incentives from shareholders, especially in takeover situations. As noted by Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004, p. 38) :
"By selling the firm, target CEOs may be giving up substantial expected utility from both future wages (if they are not retained) and the lost ability to extract personal benefits from the firm." In addition, target CEOs generally lose a large amount of their firm specific human capital investment when they sell their firms. All of these issues lead the target managers to consider a tradeoff in dealing with a takeover bid -a positive gain from the takeover premium for the shares or options they own compared with the losses in human capital they will suffer upon the acquisition of their firm.
While target CEOs are concerned about the impact of the acquisition on their overall personal wealth, target shareholders care almost entirely about the financial value of their shares. Most firms have internal contracts that help make sure that this potential conflict of interest will not forestall value-increasing merger bids with typical levels of premiums. Contractual provisions such as equity incentives and golden parachutes help increase manager benefits and decrease human capital costs to the managers so that the incentives to accept bids are roughly aligned. When these provisions work effectively, both managers and outside shareholders share the gains to wealth that accrue from a typical value-increasing takeover bid.
Things can go badly awry with the process, however, when the possible synergies between the target and a potential acquirer are relatively low (but positive). In this case, the premium that the acquirer will offer will be low. This will reduce any gains to the target manager through equity incentives.
Furthermore, the cost in future wages is usually high for CEOs that sell their firm for a low premium. 1 Thus, when synergies are low but positive, manager and shareholder incentives in the target are likely to be misaligned. This misalignment is important because it can cause wealth reductions for all parties involved. Furthermore, in cases in which expected synergies are low, the target CEO is in a relatively strong bargaining position because the bidder's premium offer is modest. Target stockholders will therefore have a sound basis for accepting their CEO's advice to refuse the merger offer as inadequate, if the CEO makes a rejection recommendation. This could thwart all gains from the potential takeover.
All of these arguments suggest that when a value increasing takeover bid arises, but the takeover involves only a small amount of value improvement, a contractual adjustment is important to maximize shareholder value. The merger bonus represents a useful adjustment that addresses the conflict of interest affecting the parties involved and that avoids value dissipation.
Our alternative view ties low synergy directly to the use of a merger bonus as an inducement, as opposed to equity-value-based side payments, as part of merger negotiations. Because the premium paid for a low synergy target is small, the appreciation accruing to equity-based pay will be small. Therefore, all else equal, an unusually large amount of stock or options would be required to get buy-in from the target CEO.
2 Many compensation contract agreements provide golden parachute provisions to address this issue. These provisions often call for a parachute payment equal to three times the executive's annual cash pay. In theory, these parachute payments could be enough to address the shortcoming issue associated with stock/option merger-related pay when premiums are low. However in practice, since equity-based pay often accounts for a considerable portion of the total compensation received by CEOs in U.S. public companies, parachutes may not fully address this issue. In these circumstances, a cash bonus provides a more practical way to deliver a payment in order to get the target CEO's support for the deal.
2 Ross (2004) theorizes that more equity-based pay could make an agent more (instead of less) risk averse. Hence, more options could actually lead target CEOs to consent to a lower premium instead of bargaining for a higher offer. This could happen because according to Ross (2004) , attitudes towards risk depend not only on the convexity of an agent's overall pay schedule, but also on how the schedule maps into more (or less) risk averse areas of the agent's utility function to the extent that the mapping can remove the effect of convex (or concave) compensation schedules.
To empirically investigate these hypotheses, we focus on how four different acquisition characteristics are associated with merger bonuses: (1) the premium offered to targets, (2) the total synergy created by the deals, (3) the acquirer returns in the deals, and (4) the post-acquisition operating performance of the merged firms.
Both the wealth transfer and the contractual revision hypotheses, as well as past evidence, predict lower target premiums (1) when a merger bonus is provided to the target CEO. But from there, the predictions of the hypotheses differ. Under the wealth transfer hypothesis, target CEOs do not negotiate hard with the acquirer over premiums when merger bonuses exist, and the acquirer gets away with paying too little. This implies that the acquirer should reap larger acquisition gains (3) when there are target merger bonuses. In contrast, under the contractual revision hypothesis, the reason for the lower premium when there are bonuses is smaller overall synergies (2). In this case, when there is a merger bonus (and thus inferior synergies from the deal) the gains to the acquirer should not necessarily be higher (3).
Moreover, we should also expect that the smaller synergies for bonus firms should show up in smaller improvements in post-acquisition firm performance (4), if the contractual revision view is true.
We test our hypotheses about merger bonuses for target CEOs in a sample of 949 publicly traded targets that receive an acquisition bid during 1999-2009. Consistent with the evidence on other takeover benefits, in deals where the target CEO gets a merger bonus, targets get premiums about four percentage points lower. However, we do not detect a transfer of wealth to bidder shareholders from target shareholders in these transactions. Actually, the point estimates of the effect of bonuses on acquirer (short-and long-term) wealth gains are negative (-1.83% and -1.64%) and statistically significant. These results are inconsistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis. In addition, we also show that synergies are about 1.56% lower in deals in which the target CEO gets a merger bonus. Our findings therefore suggest that the lower takeover premiums associated with merger bonuses are due to lower overall gains from the deal. This is consistent with the contractual revision alternative.
Because endogeneity is at the heart of the dispute between the wealth transfer hypothesis and the contractual revision alternative, we use two different techniques to evaluate the effects and associations involving bonuses: an instrumental variable (IV) approach and a propensity score matching procedure.
The instrument we use exploits an alternative reason for a contractual revision: linking the bonus to a non-compete agreement to prevent outgoing target CEOs from using their firm-specific knowledge to compete against the merged firm. One of the problems with non-compete agreements, however, is that in some states they are hard to enforce. Fortunately, Garmaise (2011) has constructed an index of the level of enforceability of non-compete agreements by state. Therefore, we use this index as our IV. This index appears to satisfy both the exclusion restriction, being orthogonal to any synergy or return outcome, and the relevancy condition, being strongly related to the presence of bonuses in our determinants tests. The results with this IV are similar, but if anything slightly more supportive of the contractual revision hypothesis and less consistent with any wealth transfer.
To reinforce our IV approach, we use a propensity score matching method. After matching on multiple firm characteristics, we continue to find evidence that rejects the wealth transfer hypothesis in favor of the contractual revision alternative: both target premiums and acquirer returns are lower in deals where target CEOs receive a merger bonus.
Our results that the use of cash bonuses potentially induce CEOs to act in their shareholders' interests (given the firm's operating environment) add new and important information to the literature on how to best structure executive compensation. Our view of contractual revision, however, is quite different from the usual type of shareholders' interests or incentive alignment discussed in the literature. The usual discussion, as in Wulf (2004) and Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) , argues that incentives are better aligned when managers have more stock or stock-like compensation payoffs, since managers will then have incentives to behave in accordance with the tastes of shareholders with similar payoffs. Our analyses indicate that some transactions require giving target managers some very non-stock-like incentives such as a merger bonus. Such a benefit is provided to undo the conflict target CEOs face during a takeover deal expected to generate low synergy gains.
The findings herein-supporting the contractual revision view-contribute evidence to the theoretical literature modeling endogenously determined optimal wage contracts (see, for example, Hölmstrom (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , and Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991) ). In general, our results also advance an extensive empirical literature that examines the endogenous relation between different corporate practices and firm value. In particular, our paper complements the results in Palia (2001) . He examines the effect of incentive compatible compensation (through options granted and share ownership)
on firm value and finds that taking into account the endogeneity of this compensation indicates that firms set managerial pay in response to their contracting environment.
This study also helps complete the literature studying merger bonuses dispensed during acquisitions. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that bidding CEOs often receive a merger bonus regardless of whether the acquisition creates value for the acquiring shareholders. In contrast, our evidence is consistent with the view that a merger bonus mitigates conflicts of interest between target CEOs and their shareholders.
In addition, our findings complement (rather than contradict) those in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) . Those authors show an inverse association between target premiums and a general set of mergerrelated benefits given to target CEOs but do not examine whether such benefits, collectively or individually, affect the value of the acquirer firm.
From a public policy perspective, our paper adds important information related to recent changes in securities laws that explicitly allow target firms to give merger bonuses and other benefits to their executives during takeovers. 3 From an academic perspective, our findings on bonuses demonstrate that 3 On October 18, 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unanimously approved amendments to Rule 14d-10(a) (2) (commonly known as the "best price" rule) applicable to tender offers for securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This rule was originally written to ensure equal treatment among target shareholders by requiring the highest consideration paid to any one security holder in a class be the consideration paid to all security holders in the same class. The new amendments expressly state that the best price rule does not apply to payments to top managers, directors, or other employees of a target company entered into in connection with an acquisition of the target. The amendments now enable the target's board of directors to approve cash bonuses, severance, or other employee benefit arrangements for its executives during an acquisition negotiation.
examining explicit components of the merger pay package to target CEOs explains critical facts about the deal and about the role of specific benefits. In this vein, our results complement the findings in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010) , a study focused entirely on target CEOs hired by the bidder after takeovers are completed. Their results on target CEOs that receive employment in the merged firm and ours on target CEOs that get a merger bonus indicate that certain merger-related benefits are a function (i) of the target firm's operating and information environment, and (ii) of the target CEO's reservation wage and future career opportunities.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and the merger bonuses awarded to target CEOs. Section 3 presents our empirical analyses. Section 4 contains additional tests. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Variable Definitions
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics for the sample we use and present information related to the merger bonuses given to target CEOs in the transactions we study.
Acquisition sample
We begin with 4,455 merger and acquisition (M&A) bids tracked by the Securities Data Company (SDC) announced during [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] in which the target is a publicly traded U.S. company. This initial sample excludes spinoffs, recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, self-tenders, privatizations, acquisitions of remaining interest, partial interests or assets, and transactions for which deal value is not disclosed. We retain 3,807 deals in which targets have stock market and accounting data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. We drop 324 bids for which we cannot obtain acquisition premium data from SDC or other sources. We also require corporate governance data for the target company from RiskMetrics, deal background and target CEO exit compensation arrangement information from the merger proxy filed by the target and/or acquirer with the SEC or from news event searches in Lexis/Nexis. These criteria yield our final sample of 949 deals.
In Panel A of Table 1 , we report the temporal and industrial distribution of the 949 sample targets.
The industrial distribution of our targets, which follows the classification in Fama and French (1997) , mirrors the industrial distribution of targets in SDC during our sample period. 4 In addition, the annual number of mergers announced is higher at the beginning of our sample period, which coincides with times of economic expansion. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) This frequency also resembles that in Bates and Lemmon (2003) .
We read the S-4, DEFM 14, SC 14D9, SC TO, DEF 14, and 8-K filed by the acquirer and/or target firms with the SEC and find that in over 36% of our transactions, the target firm initiates the deal. This incidence is similar to that of 42% reported in the sample of deals occurring during 1994-2006 studied by Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) . The bidder is from the same Fama and French (1997) industry as the target in 54% of our sample, which is comparable to that of 53% in Officer (2004) . Deals in our sample exhibit an average value of $4.611 billion. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) also report a large mean deal value of $4.7 billion for transactions in their sample of acquisitions during 1993-1999. Lemmon (2003) report a mean value of 0.233 for the targets they study. Overall, the descriptive statistics of deals and targets in our sample appear in line with those reported in the previous literature.
Merger bonuses
We also read the different merger-related filings by either the target or the acquirer with the SEC to identify whether the target firm awards its CEO a merger bonus. CEOs have a merger bonus clause in their compensation contract when they are first hired by the target firm. We categorize the description given for the merger bonus in the proxy filings and report this information in Panel B of Table 2 . Most target boards justify these payments as "consulting" fees (59 cases), "noncompetition" agreements (41 cases), "signing" consents (6 cases) or "management" (1 case)
as required by the buyer. Other target firms categorize these payments as "retention" (58 cases), "special" (8 cases), "stay" (3 cases), "termination" (6 cases), "transition" (2 cases) or "separation" (1 case) made in consideration of the annulment of the CEO's employment agreement. The remaining boards award these payments in order to recognize the target CEO's leadership in executing the transaction. In these instances, the payments are described as "bonus" (20 cases), "merger" (17 cases), "transaction" (11 cases), or "special recognition" (1 case). 6 We note that the incidence of "non-compete" and "consulting" descriptions for the merger bonus (which are required by the buyer) suggests that many bidders want to prevent target CEOs from competing against the merged firm. Consistent with the contracting revision view, these restrictions on the managers suggest that bonuses are used to implement an ex-post contractual adjustment in an ex-ante compensation contract that might be inefficient.
For the 219 cases in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus, we report summary statistics of the cash paid for this benefit. This information appears in Panel C of Table 2 . Relative to the median transaction value for deals in our sample (over $1.5 billion), merger bonuses appear to be quite modest.
On average, these payments amount to about $1.6 million with a maximum value of $12 million.
Empirical Analyses
In order to distinguish among our hypotheses, we perform several tests aimed at examining the causes and consequences of merger bonuses awarded to target CEOs.
Why do target firms give their CEOs merger bonuses?
To explore the characteristics of targets that provide a merger bonus in our sample of 949 targets, we run three regressions of the determinants of these benefits and report the results in Table 3 . In the logit regression reported as model (1), we set the dependent variable to one if the target is among the 219 firms with a merger bonus and set it to zero otherwise. In the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) we report as model (2), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the merger bonus value. In model (3), we estimate a tobit regression in which the dependent variable is the dollar value of the merger bonus scaled by the total compensation the target CEO receives in the year prior to the acquisition announcement. 7,8 All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects and for other variables that we define in the 6 The reasons for the merger bonus add to more than 219 because, in many instances, target firms use more than one rationale to justify this benefit. 7 We also scale the bonus by the target's market value of equity. All results continue to obtain with this variable. 8 The dependent variable in models (2) and (3) is set to zero if the target CEO does not a get a merger bonus.
Appendix. Because other components of the merger pay package to the target CEO might be simultaneously negotiated with the bonus, our tests control for other benefits such as golden parachutes, unscheduled stock options, and a job in the merged firm. Other control variables (e.g. CEOs near retirement age and CEO stock ownership) are similar to those in Hartzell et al. (2004) .
Under the wealth transfer hypothesis, target CEOs with undue power over their boards are more likely to receive a merger bonus. Some results in Table 3 percentage points. In addition, to measure the influence of the target CEO over the compensation committee we define a dummy variable which we label "handpicked compensation committee." This variable, defined following the logic in Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) about CEO involvement in selecting committee members, is set to one whenever the CEO has been in office longer than the majority of the members in the compensation committee. The results in Table 3 indicate that target CEOs are 5.91
percentage points more likely to get a merger bonus when the board's compensation committee is handpicked. Hansen (1987) argues that acquirers are more likely to use stock (instead of cash) to buy a target when the prospects of the deal are rather uncertain. He maintains that the use of stock forces target shareholders to share in the risk of the merger. Following this premise, it is possible that deals involving a low synergy target have a more uncertain outcome. If this is the case, mergers in which the target CEO gets a bonus should be less likely to be structured as all-cash deals and more likely to involve the bidders' stock. Relatedly, Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2012) find that cash targets experience a revaluation that becomes permanent in the event the deal is withdrawn. They argue that cash offers (but not stock offers)
reflect positive news about the stand-alone value of the target which suggests that non-cash targets are of inferior quality relative to cash targets. Consistent with these views, the results in Table 3 document an inverse association between the Cash payment (0,1) indicator and all of our bonus proxies. According to the estimates in model (1), the probability of getting a merger bonus decreases by 7.67 percentage points when the transaction is structured as an all cash deal.
In a theoretical study about golden parachutes, Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) view parachutes as implicit deferred compensation, already earned but not yet received, that promotes managerial human capital investment in the firm. Our contracting revision hypothesis suggests that the merger bonus helps target CEOs recoup their firm specific human capital investment and predicts that bonuses should be more prevalent when parachutes are small or not provided. In line with this prediction, we note that Table   3 documents an inverse and statistically significant association between bonuses and parachute provisions. The estimates in model (1) of Table 3 imply that a drop of one standard deviation in parachute value increases the probability of a bonus by 1.11 percentage points. The parachute estimate in model (2) indicates that a $1 decline in the parachute payment raises the bonus by $0.67.
According to the information in Table 2 , many target CEOs' compensation contracts are adjusted with a merger bonus to possibly stop these executives from competing against the merged firm.
Therefore, in Table 3 , we control for whether non-competition agreements are enforceable in the state in which the acquisition takes place with a variable based on the index proposed by Garmaise (2011). 10 Notably, according to model (1), an increase of one unit in the non-compete index (i.e. less enforceability)
is associated with a 1.99 percentage point decline in the probability that the target CEO gets a merger bonus. This result suggests that target firms are more likely to give their CEOs a merger bonus in jurisdictions where a related non-compete agreement can be enforced. Overall, the results in our merger bonus determinant regressions partly support both the wealth transfer hypothesis and the contracting revision alternative.
Merger bonuses and acquisition premiums
In all the tests that follow, we use four different metrics for the merger bonus as independent variables. The first is a (0,1) dummy variable set to one if the target CEO receives a merger bonus. The second proxy is the natural logarithm of the merger bonus payment. The third is the dollar value of the merger bonus scaled by the total compensation the target CEO receives in the year prior to the acquisition announcement. The fourth is the fitted bonus dummy from a first stage regression (model (1) in Table 3 ).
In that first stage test, we use an index of the enforceability of non-compete agreements by state proposed by Garmaise (2011) as an instrument. The results in Table 3 , in which the coefficient for the index is statistically different from zero, indicate that this variable satisfies the relevance condition. 11 Our assertion that non-compete agreements are orthogonal to takeover premiums, synergies, or acquisition return outcomes is supported by Garmaise's (2011, p. 414) conclusion that "the enforceability of noncompetition agreements has no net effect on firm value." Therefore, given the exogenous nature of the enforceability of non-compete agreements, it appears that our instrument also meets the exclusion restriction. In all tests in which the fitted bonus is used as the independent variable, the standard errors are adjusted due to the instrumentation, because the regression for the presence of a merger bonus is a logit model (Maddala (1983, p. 244-245) ).
In Table 4 we estimate four regressions with year-and industry-fixed effects using the four-week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable and the four proxies for the merger bonus (described above) as the respective key independent variables. 12 Our target premium tests closely follow the 11 The first-stage χ 2 is large, indicating that our estimation is efficient. Furthermore, the F-statistic on the instrument in our first stage is above critical values from a Stock-Yogo weak identification test. We employ the methods outlined by Stock and Watson (2010) and by Hall and Peixe (2003) to test the validity of our instrument and ensure that the relevancy condition is satisfied. 12 Following Officer (2003), we limit the premium to values between 0 and 2 (or 200%). specification in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010) . The Appendix provides the definition for all other control variables.
We note that the estimates for several control variables in Table 4 are in agreement with the existing M&A literature. For example, we find acquisition premiums to be higher in deals characterized as tender offers (Huang and Walkling, 1987) and in all cash transactions (Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi, 2012) .
Premiums also increase with the existence of a target termination fee (Bates and Lemmon, 2003, and Officer, 2003) . In contrast, acquisition premiums are inversely related to the size of the target firm, also decline when the bidder is a private company (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2010) , and when the transaction is characterized as a merger of equals (Wulf, 2004, and Xie, 2009 ).
The premium tests in Table 4 control for target initiated deals because the findings in Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) suggest that this variable is a reasonable proxy for the target's bargaining power. 13 The results in Table 4 suggest that bargaining power affects the gains to target shareholders in mergers: bid premiums are about 3.29% to 3.52% lower in deals initiated by the target firm. This result agrees with those in Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) . They also document an inverse association between acquisition premiums and target initiated deals.
More importantly, the merger bonus coefficients in all models of Table 4 document an economically important inverse association between this benefit and takeover premiums. According to the estimates in model (1), the presence of a bonus is associated with a decline in premium of 4.1 percentage points. Such a decline implies a drop of about $197 million in terms of deal value. Similarly, according to the estimates in model (2), every $1 increase in the merger bonus lowers deal value by about $11. Thus, although the merger bonus is quite small relative to the average deal size, it is associated with a disproportionately large premium decline.
14 13 In addition, our premium tests include input-output/sales-purchases control variables between the target and the acquirer industries similar to those in Ahern (2012) . He argues that these customer-supplier variables capture the market power of the parties to an acquisition and, therefore, help account for the role of product markets on bargaining outcomes in mergers. 14 In recent empirical work, Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) revisit well established findings in the corporate governance literature related to the association between board size and firm performance and also between board
Using an IV approach, we address the possibility of co-determination of merger bonuses and takeover premiums. We report the second-stage results of the IV regression in the last column of Table 4 .
Consistent with the other regressions in the table, the coefficient on the instrumented bonus variable is statistically significant with an estimate of -4.36%.
At first glance, the results in Table 4 suggest that target CEOs that receive a merger bonus sacrifice substantial shareholder wealth for personal gain. This finding is consistent with the interpretation in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) and the wealth transfer hypothesis. However, this result is also consistent with the contracting revision alternative. The next two subsections provide our key tests that help differentiate these hypotheses.
Merger bonuses and acquisition synergies
In Table 5 , we estimate four regressions of the acquisition synergies for the 497 transactions in our sample where the bidder is a publicly traded firm. 15 These tests, which include year and industry fixed effects, are similar to those in Xie (2009). Following Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) , the dependent variable in all models in Table 5 is the total percentage synergistic gain from acquisitions (or merger synergy). We compute this variable as the three day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a value-weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target around the merger announcement date. 16 This CAR independence and performance. Wintoki et al. (2012) find that the inverse and significant association between board size and performance documented by Yermack (1996) and others is not robust to controls for different lags of performance. Similarly, those authors also find that board independence (Weisbach, 1988) is no longer significantly related to firm performance once performance lags are used as additional explanatory variables. Wintoki et al. argue that their findings illustrate an often ignored source of endogeneity in the literature: that current observations of the key explanatory variable (board size or board independence in their analyses) are not independent of past values of the (performance) dependent variables. In our case and following the rationale in Wintoki et al., it is possible that the merger bonus the target CEO receives is not independent of previous firm performance. To investigate this issue, in untabulated analyses we re-estimate the target premium regressions reported in Table 4 including three lags of annual stock performance. These tests show that the inverse association between the bonus and the premium is robust to controls for different lags of target firm performance. 15 The proportion of public acquirers that bid for a public target in our sample is 497 / 949 = 52%. This is close to the incidence of public acquirers that we can infer from the tests in Bates and Lemmon (2003) . They run target return tests for all public targets as well as bidder return regressions for subsamples of public acquirers. Based on the number of observations they report, we estimate that the proportion of public bidders in their data is 57% to 59%. 16 When necessary, we adjust for the percentage of target shares held by the bidder two days prior to the merger announcement.
is calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. The independent variables of interest in the four regressions reported in Table 5 are our four merger bonus proxies, respectively. The Appendix details the remaining control variables.
The parameter estimates related to our control variables in Table 5 yield results that agree with those in the existing literature. For example, the inferences related to statistically significant variables such as bidder size, cash payment (0,1), and merger of equals (0,1) are similar to those in Wang and Xie (2009) .
The results associated with our key independent variables document an inverse association between all of our proxies for the merger bonus and the synergy gains. According to the coefficient estimate in model
(1), the presence of a merger bonus is associated with a 1.56% decline in synergies.
Merger bonuses and acquirer returns
The low synergy associated with bonuses, coupled with our earlier finding of low premiums, suggests two possibilities. One, consistent with the contracting revision hypothesis, is that bonuses are given when targets have low synergies, and these lead to low premiums but no extraordinary wealth gain to acquirers.
The other, consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, is that merger bonuses lead to larger acquirer wealth gains even though the synergies are low. In this view, low synergies may lead to low premiums, but the conflict of interest of the target CEO makes the premium even lower where there are bonuses.
In this section, we analyze the short-and long-run acquisition returns to the bidders to differentiate between our hypotheses.
Acquisition announcement returns
To analyze the possible effect of merger bonuses on acquirer returns, we use the standard event-study methodology to estimate the three-day market model-adjusted CAR centered on the announcement of the acquisition and accruing to the 497 publicly traded buyers in our sample. As before, the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. Table 6 reports four OLS regressions using this CAR as the dependent variable and the four merger bonus proxies as the respective key explanatory variables. All regressions control for various deal, market, and bidder characteristics similar to those in the acquirer return regressions estimated in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) .
Looking at the control variables in Table 6 , we note that several controls produce results that conform to the existing literature. For example, as in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) , the relative size variable yields negative estimates. In addition, similar to Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) , bidder size is inversely related to the acquirer return. As in Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2012) acquirer returns are higher when cash is used to buy the target firm.
The estimates for the merger bonus variables in all regression models reported in Table 6 are negative and statistically significant. The coefficient for the merger bonus dummy in model (1) of Table 6 indicates that acquirer returns decline by 1.83% when deals include this benefit. Thus, the effect we estimate is economically important: this lower return is related to a market capitalization drop of about $568 million for the average bidder in our sample. The results from our second stage IV regression reported in the last column of Table 6 indicate a more severe return reduction of 2.33%.
Long-run operating gains to mergers
The lower announcement returns for bidders buying targets that give their CEOs a merger bonus indicate that investors view the future prospects of the merged firm to be bleak. To ascertain whether this pessimism is warranted, we perform an alternative test based on an ex-post (long-run) measure of operating performance. This test is also useful because we are concerned that the market reaction may not be the best place to look for the synergy value when the offer price is low. That is, following the theory in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , it is possible that target shareholders accept a low offer because they believe the synergies are low (and thus the market reaction is low). In such a scenario, the acquirer could be getting a good deal -and the target CEO may have needed a side payment (such as a merger bonus) to let this happen-it is just the market that does not know. This lack of knowledge could explain the lower announcement returns to the acquirer firms in these deals. In fact, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model a case in which a similar situation happens: the short-run CEO is "paid" to sell the company for less than it is worth in the long-run and the market does not notice. To address this possibility, we examine the longrun operating performance of the merged firm. The advantage of this approach is that it provides evidence based on accounting information rather than on market data. Consequently, our operating gain to mergers tests are unlikely to be biased by either market sentiment or investors' perceptions.
In Table 7 we estimate four OLS regressions of the operating gains to mergers, calculated as the mean industry-adjusted ROA over the three-year post-merger period. These regressions examine the 417 completed deals made by U.S. public bidders in our sample. Our Table 7 tests follow those in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and in Harford, Humphrey-Jenner, and Powell (2012) and control, among other things, for pre-merger industry-adjusted ROA which we estimate as the combined acquirer-target industry-adjusted ROA for the fiscal year before the takeover. We augment the specification used in previous studies by including our merger bonus proxies as additional control variables.
As in Harford et al. (2012) , the coefficient estimate for pre-merger industry-adjusted ROA is positive and significant. More importantly, all of our merger bonus variables exhibit significantly negative estimates. According to the merger bonus indicator in model (1), over the three years following the deal, the industry-adjusted operating performance of the merged firm declines by 1.64% relative to deals without bonuses. The second-stage IV regression suggests a sharper decline of 2.16%
Together with the target premium results, those in Table 6 and Table 7 show that acquirers of targets that provide their CEOs a merger bonus are paying less for the target but are not capturing rents from the shareholders of the firms they buy. In fact, the performance of these acquirers is worse in deals where bonuses exist. This is the key result helping to differentiate our hypotheses about bonuses to target CEOs.
The lower acquirer returns where merger bonuses are present indicate that we should reject the wealth transfer hypothesis. Yet, the lower returns are consistent with the contracting revision alternative view.
Additional tests
This section describes further analyses performed in order to probe the robustness of the preceding findings.
Propensity score matching
If our instrument fails the exclusion restriction of being uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage equations, our IV estimates in Tables 4, 5 , 6, and 7 can be biased. This could happen if nonlinear relations of our variables or omitted covariates bias our estimates. Therefore, to assess the robustness of our instrumental variables approach, we use a propensity score matching procedure to estimate an average treatment effect (ATE) of merger bonuses to target CEOs on acquisition outcomes.
The propensity matching is well suited to mitigate concerns related to asymptotic biases that can arise from endogeneity or self-selection.
The first step of our propensity score matching procedure uses a logit model to estimate the probability of being in the treated group (i.e., of awarding a merger bonus to the target CEO similar to model (1) in Table 3 ) as a function of observable characteristics. In the second step, we use the estimated ex ante probability of being in the treated group to form matched pairs of observations with similar estimated ex ante probability of being in the treated group but different ex post realizations of the treatment.
The key feature of our propensity score procedure is that it analyzes target firms that are jointly similar in all the matching dimensions but different in terms of their bonus award decision. Therefore, our method estimates the counterfactual outcomes of target firms by using the outcomes from a subsample of matched target firms from the other group (treatment or control). Differences in performance measures between the two groups (such as target premiums or acquirer returns) measure the effect of the merger bonus. This measurement however relies on the crucial assumption that we have enough controls -pretreatment covariates and outcomes-so that, conditional on those controls, treatment assignment is essentially randomized (Imbens and Rubin, 2013 ).
In our matching procedure (reported in Panel A of Table 8 ), we use all the control variables and fixed effects we use in our baseline specification in model (1) of The empirical results from our propensity matching score methodology show that deals in which the target CEO gets a merger bonus exhibit significantly lower target premiums, synergies, acquirer returns, and post-deal operating performance. Panel B of Table 8 reports the respective ATE for these variables, -4.92%, -2.16%, -2.11%, and -2.14%. These effects generate inferences similar to those arising from our earlier analyses which reject the wealth transfer hypothesis in favor of the contractual revision alternative.
Hard-to-sell targets
The lower takeover premiums received by targets that give their CEOs a merger bonus coupled with the lower acquirer returns in these deals do not support the wealth transfer hypothesis. Instead, and consistent with the contracting revision alternative, in these transactions acquirers pay less for the targets but also get less in the form of low synergies. It is possible that, ceteris paribus, the lower synergy gains associated with these firms do not make them attractive takeover targets. In this scenario, which is also consistent with the contracting revision view, the merger bonus could be provided to CEOs heading hard-to-sell targets. That is, the bonus is a reward given to CEOs able to negotiate and successfully accomplish the takeover of their hard-to-sell targets.
We run two (untabulated) logit models to evaluate the hard-to-sell conjecture. Specifically, in one test we estimate the probability that the deal involves multiple bidders (two or more) using a specification similar to that in Officer (2003) . In the other test we estimate the probability that the deal is initiated by the target firm with a logit regression similar to that in Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010) . The main independent variable in both of these tests is a bonus indicator that is set to one if the target awards a merger bonus to its CEO (and set to zero otherwise initiate their own sale earn inferior premiums. In general, the results of our multiple bidders and target initiation tests suggest that targets that give their CEOs a merger bonus appear to be hard-to-sell-targets.
Under this interpretation, the results just described also support the hypothesis that bonuses arise as a way to adjust managerial compensation for CEOs in low synergy (hard-to-sell) targets.
Acquisition premium and acquirer return alternatives
The tests presented in Table 4 use the four-week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable.
In untabulated analyses we re-estimate the Table 4 regressions using three different premium measures.
The alternative premium proxies are (1) the target's CAR during the window (-20, +1) relative to the announcement date as in Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) , (2) the target's CAR during the window (-42, +126)
following Schwert (1996) , and (3) the "combined" merger premium defined in Officer (2003) as the dependent variable.
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The results from the ancillary tests are similar to those in Table 4 and document an inverse association between the use of a merger bonus and the takeover premium. According to the estimates, premiums are 3.58 to 5.2 percentage points lower when these benefits are part of the merger pay package given to target CEOs.
In separate unreported analyses, we estimate several acquirer return regressions similar to those reported in Table 6 . In those tests, we follow the procedure in Masulis Wang, and Xie (2007) and replace the acquirer's return with the CAR accruing to the bidder on deal announcement during the (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) windows. In both tests, the coefficients for the merger bonus are still negative and significantly related to the acquirer's return. For instance, the estimate for the merger bonus indicator in the regression that measures acquirer returns during the (-2, +2) window is -0.0172, p-value = 0.0368. In line with our tabulated results, this estimate implies a decline of almost $534 million in terms of the market capitalization for the average bidder in our sample.
Examining different subsamples
Earlier we note that 29 CEOs in our sample have a merger bonus provision in their compensation contracts once they are hired. Upon closer examination of these 29 cases, we note that in all instances the bonus amount is never disclosed. Instead, these provisions state that the bonus payment is to be "determined at a later time." Nevertheless, we are concerned that for these 29 CEOs the bonus does not necessarily provide a contractual adjustment. As a result, we rerun our tests excluding these 29 cases. All of our results continue to hold after omitting these observations. For example, deals in which the target 17 Specifically, following Officer (2003) , we first estimate a premium based on component data using the aggregate value of cash, stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then estimate premiums based on initial price and final price data, respectively. These prices are also reported by SDC. All premium measures are then deflated by the target's market value 42 trading days prior to the bid announcement. The combined premium is based on the component measure if it is greater than zero and less than two. Otherwise, the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on the final price measure if initial price data are missing).
CEO receives a merger bonus exhibit 3.64% lower premiums (p-value = 0.05), 1.52% lower synergies (pvalue = 0.04), 1.93% lower acquirer returns (p-value = 0.02), and 1.77% lower post-merger operating performance (p-value = 0.03). These findings are consistent with those reported earlier.
We perform acquirer return tests (Table 5 ) and synergy analyses (Table 6 ) in the subsample that includes publicly traded bidders (497 cases). To further evaluate the robustness of our results, we use this subsample to re-estimate the bonus determinants and the takeover premium regressions. The new results essentially match those tabulated. For instance, the probability of getting a bonus increases by 9.6% for CEOs who also chair their boards and by 3% for a one point increase in the E-index. The probability declines by 2% for target CEOs for a one standard deviation increase in the value of their golden parachute and by 2.1% for a one point increase in the non-compete index (less enforceability). In this subsample we find that the presence of a bonus is associated with a decline in the takeover premium of Tables 5 and 6 are not unusual.
5.04% (p-value = 0.04). This ancillary evidence indicates that the subsamples analyzed in

Conclusions
Do target CEOs that get extra payments during takeovers sell out their shareholders for their own personal gain? The evidence in recent academic studies on different merger-related side benefits given to target CEOs implies that the answer to this question is usually "yes." This consensus emerges because the target shareholders evaluated in those papers on average receive lower merger premiums when their CEOs get extra benefits. As a result, the prevalent perception in the existing literature is that side payments to target CEOs represent a conflict of interest that occurs in takeover target firms with serious agency problems which manifest in the form of a wealth transfer from shareholders of the target to shareholders of the buyer.
In stark contrast with the existing academic literature, our empirical evidence on merger bonuses raises serious doubts about the hypothesis that these side payments lead self-serving target CEOs to compromise the interests of their shareholders. Instead, our results indicate that with these side payments self-serving target CEOs do not compromise the interests of their shareholders. Therefore our findings support the alternative view that merger bonuses are used to implement a contractual revision in compensation to circumvent conflicts of interest that arise between target CEOs and target shareholdersparticularly in takeover deals that generate small synergies.
While we find lower premiums paid to target shareholders when target CEOs get merger bonuses, we find lower (instead of higher) acquirer merger returns in these transactions. Indeed, both the bidder CARs upon the merger announcement and the three-year operating gains to mergers accruing to the acquirers are inversely related to the merger bonus. These results reveal that acquirer shareholders in these deals do not experience a transfer of wealth from target shareholders. These findings indicate that when target
CEOs get merger bonuses, bidders pay less to acquire the targets but they also buy less in the form of low synergies. According to our results, it appears that a merger bonus helps target firms adjust the compensation of their CEOs during acquisitions to address potential weaknesses in ex-ante contractual agreements. This conclusion is supported by evidence that (i) merger bonuses are more frequent when golden parachutes are small (or not offered), and (ii) bonuses are often tied to agreements that preclude the target CEO from competing against the merged firm. This conclusion is also supported by the synergy and acquirer return results.
Overall, our findings are consistent with the contractual revision hypothesis of merger bonuses to target CEOs. Therefore, because merger bonuses seem to mitigate rather than exacerbate agency problems in low synergy targets, they serve an important economic role by providing a necessary adjustment in the merger-related compensation received by target CEOs.
Notwithstanding our results on merger bonuses, we cannot decisively assess whether these payments are beneficial to target shareholders. Our sample includes bids for targets that are made public. As a result, we cannot know whether target CEOs demand merger bonuses or other benefits during negotiations in which a potentially value enhancing bid is never made public. Thus the usual caveats in interpreting the results in this literature apply to this paper as well.
Nonetheless, our analyses show that firm-and transaction-specific circumstances could justify additional managerial benefits in somewhat counterintuitive situations (in our case, low synergy takeovers). In fact, our evidence suggests that merger bonuses can benefit target shareholders especially when their companies generate inferior synergies with potential bidders. In this regard, our results indicate that larger executive compensation packages and even side payments -particularly when payoffs to shareholders are low-do not always represent nefarious managerial behavior and may have productive consequences in encouraging useful deals. Panel A provides a breakdown of our sample deals based on whether the target CEO receives a merger bonus. Panel B shows the number of cases under different terms used by the target board to indicate a merger bonus. We obtain this information by reading the merger proxies, the last annual proxies and other forms before the merger announcement filed by either the target or the acquirer with the SEC (for example, S-4, DEFM 14, SC 14D9, SC TO, DEF 14, . In Panel C, we report the summary statistics of the merger bonus value for 219 cases in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus, and the same value scaled by the target CEO's total compensation during the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement.
Panel A: Target level information
Full sample 949 Targets in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus 219 Target CEOs that have a merger bonus clause when they are first hired 29 Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) . This CAR is calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. The target's weight is adjusted for the bidder's toehold. Acquirer CAR (-1,+1) the acquirer's CAR over the window (-1,+1) around the merger announcement date, calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement Merged firm post-deal op. performance the operating gain to mergers, calculated as the mean industry-adjusted ROA over the three-year post-merger period as in Harford, Humphrey-Jenner, and Powell ( 
Panel B: Terms used by the target board to indicate a merger bonus
